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AQUINAS ON FAITH AND SCIENCE 
Kenneth J. Konyndyk 
Aquinas's reflection on the relationship between faith and science took place 
amidst serious controversy about the acceptability of the very form of science 
Aquinas had adopted. Aquinas uses the Aristotelian conception of science 
and his own view of the place of theology and faith, to produce arguments 
for the compatibility of reason and science. I examine the arguments he 
presents in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and I criticize details of his argu-
ments, but I endorse what I see as his general strategy. 
The assimilation of the philosophy and science of Aristotle by Northern 
Europeans during the thirteenth century was a contentious business, nowhere 
more so than at the University of Paris where St. Thomas Aquinas spent a 
substantial part of his academic career. The major metaphysical writings of 
Aristotle, which had been lost to the medievals for several centuries, were 
just becoming available in Latin to Europe in the late twelfth and early 
thirteenth centuries. But because the commentaries accompanying his works 
were from Islamic philosophers, Aristotle came tainted by association with 
Islam. The medievals were accustomed to using commentaries on philosophi-
cal texts when they lectured on those texts. But because Aristotle came to 
them after centuries of being the preserve of Islamic philosophers, the only 
available commentaries were by Islamic philosophers, and not surprisingly 
this association led to a certain suspicion of Aristotle. 
Even worse, on three major points Aristotle affirmed positions no orthodox 
Christian could hold. He allegedly taught that the world is eternal, that it has 
always existed; he seemed to think that the soul is mortal, not surviving the 
death of the body; and he held that God pays no attention to what goes on in 
this world. In 1215, 1220, and again in 1231 it was forbidden to lecture on 
books of Aristotle at Paris, and throughout the century there were condem-
nations of propositions, many of which were taken from Aristotle, culminat-
ing in the infamous Condemnation of 1277. 
Despite these drawbacks, Aristotle seemed to many of the European me-
dievals who studied him to be the wisest, most learned, most scientific thinker 
they had ever encountered. Of course, this immediately raised for them the 
question of how Christian faith relates to rational thought, especially science, 
since the most "scientific" thinker they knew appeared to reach scientific and 
philosophical conclusions that contradict the Christian faith. 
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Aquinas comes to these questions as a convinced Aristotelian and as a 
convinced Christian. He aims to show that faith and reason are neither sepa-
rate, logically unconnected spheres, nor logically at odds with each other, but 
that they must be perfectly compatible. He thus holds not only that Aristotle's 
philosophy (i.e., for him the most reasonable available philosophy) must not 
contradict any articles of the Christian faith, but also that theology can be 
done scientifically, in Aristotle's sense of science. Aquinas argues for com-
patibility at the beginning of his Summa Contra Gentiles, and tries to exhibit 
the scientific character of theology, including its being the completion or 
perfection of the other sciences, in the opening question of the Summa 
Theologiae. In the course of his Summas Aquinas also tries to show how 
Aristotle's philosophy does not necessarily lead to the three theologically 
unacceptable positions and how his philosophy provides an intellectual 
framework well suited both to articulating the Christian faith and to display-
ing its rationality. 
In this paper, I will present some of Aquinas's main arguments from the 
Summa Contra Gentiles, Book I, Chapter 7 for the compatibility of faith and 
reason, particularly as applied to science, and I will show how his conception 
of theology as a science (using the Summa Theologiae) and his way of un-
derstanding Aristotle so as to avoid charges of heresy exemplify the solution 
he favors in those arguments. 
I will begin, however, by describing in Parts I and II what Aquinas thinks 
faith is and what reason, and especially the highest product of reason-
science (scientia), is in his sense. After I consider his arguments for compati-
bility, I will conclude with some criticisms of those arguments, even though 
I accept and endorse what I see as the basic impulse behind his position. 
I. Aquinas's Concept of Faith 
When he considers religious faith, Aquinas looks at both the act (or state) of 
faith and the object of faith. We can and do refer to a certain act as faith 
(having faith), but we also commonly describe what we believe as "the faith," 
or the articles of faith. Aquinas gives a detailed analysis of each of these 
senses of 'faith' in his extensive treatment of faith in the first sixteen ques-
tions of the second part of the Second Part of the Summa Theologiae.! 
An act of faith is an intellectual act, believing (credere) in the sense of 
firmly assenting to something that we have thought over (cum assensione 
cogitare).2 Christian faith in particular is the act of willingly assenting to or 
believing something moved by divine grace out of a desire for eternal life. 
On the scale of the acts of the intellect, faith, like belief, falls below knowl-
edge (scientia-the highest act of the intellect) and stands above opinion-as-
sent which is less firm. Faith's assent is unshakable or certain, making it 
superior to opinion, where assent is mixed with some fear that the opposite 
may be true. Faith's unshakability derives from divine grace, distinguishing 
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it from knowledge, where unshakable assent is produced by the strength of 
our "vision" of what is known (or, as we might say, the evidence). Although 
faith's degree of confidence is by no means inferior to that of knowledge 
(S. T, I, Q I, 5), faith ranks lower because the assent is not produced by the 
intellect's clear vision of the truth, but requires some kind of assistance.3 
Faith can also be distinguished from other beliefs whose "unshakability" 
derives from more ordinary sources, such as the testimony of a trusted friend 
or parent, or some evidence that we find strongly credible. 
When Aquinas talks about the Christian faith or the articles of the Christian 
faith, he thinks of faith in terms of judgments or propositions expressing the 
content of Christian belief. Nevertheless, it is also customary and proper to 
regard God as object of faith in three senses: 1) faith is taking God's word 
for something, so it is believing God (as the source of the information); 2) 
faith is a set of beliefs about God; and 3) faith has God as its proper objective 
and goal, so that faith desires God rather than someone or something else.4 
Although God is the object of faith in these senses, we ordinarily apprehend 
God by means of truths about Him, and this is a consequence of the way our 
intellect works. There is another way of apprehending objects, namely, grasp-
ing or understanding their form or essence, but this way of understanding 
God, which constitutes the beatific vision, is available to us only through the 
grace of God. Even in heaven our natural powers of knowing are riot adequate 
to knowing the essence of God. So our way of apprehending God in this life 
is through various judgments, propositions, about God. Faith, in the sense of 
"the faith," consists of many propositions that God has revealed. Some of 
these truths that God has specially revealed are knowable without special 
revelation, by some people anyway, and Thomas refers to these truths as the 
praeambula fidei. 5 The faith, strictly speaking, consists of those revealed 
articles (propositions) and their consequences to which we have no scientific 
access and which must be accepted without proof.6 Therefore, I take it that 
Aquinas does not regard the belief that God exists or that there were lepers 
in Palestine and fish in the Sea of Galilee as articles of The Faith. That God 
exists is presumably part of the science of Metaphysics, and the other exam-
ples mayor may not be included in science. Obviously, not everything im-
plied by articles of faith is also an article of faith. 
The act of faith, as he describes it, consists of the act of believing what 
God has revealed,7 moved by the Holy Spirit and our desire for eternal life. 
The act of faith also involves trust and love: we trust God when we accept 
his revelation, and our love of God informs our acceptance and motivates it. 
But, Thomas concludes, the genus of the act of faith is belief, not love or 
trust. 
Faith is both an act and a set of beliefs, and the same will be true for reason. 
Thus when discussing the relationship between faith and reason, we have to 
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consider both a relationship between sets of beliefs, and the compatibility of 
attitudes or activities. In addition to asking about the compatibility of beliefs, 
we should ask whether engaging in the act of faith is compatible with the 
rational regulation of one's beliefs. 
II. Reason 
Reason, as Thomas thinks of it, may be a faculty-the intellect-or the result 
of that faculty's operation. Ratio, perhaps the main word translated as "rea-
son," also refers to the proportioning of the mind to the thing, an idea Thomas 
takes seriously. The intellect's cognition of the essences of things is a pro-
portioning of this sort, as is judging and reasoning about things. One of the 
primary senses of the word as Thomas uses it is to denote reasoning and the 
knowledge acquired by inference.8 Reasoning is the movement of the intellect 
toward understanding (S. T., I, Q79, Art. 8). Reliance on reasoning as a means 
of understanding is proper (peculiar) to human beings, distinguishing them 
not only from animals, who lack this ability, but also from other types of 
intellectual beings-angels and God-who know immediately and without 
inference, and so do not need this ability. Reason may also refer to other sorts 
of knowledge, including probable knowledge; it can be anything intuited by 
the intellect with certainty (including knowledge of "first truths"), and it can 
refer to science-certitudes demonstrable on the basis of "first truths." The 
knowledge that constitutes science, according to St. Thomas, is of this latter sort. 
One kind of certaint/ attributed to knowledge (scientia) is a function of 
its clarity or its evidence, and this certainty is, as it were, passively acquired. 
In cases of intuitive and demonstrative knowledge, the will is not a factor in 
effecting assent; the evidence produces the intellect's assent (note that it is 
the intellect that does the assenting, not the will), so that presented with the 
evidence (or the understanding of the "terms" in the case of truths per se 
nota 10) the intellect gives its assent automatically and nonvoluntarily, in the 
sense of not involving the will rather than being contrary to the will. The will 
seems to be an inferior faculty (S. T., I, Q82, Art. 3). 
When Aquinas asks about faith and reason, there are a number of questions 
he may be dealing with. He may be asking whether believing the articles of 
the Christian faith is compatible with the activity of drawing conclusions 
rationally (that is, whether a person committed to being reasonable could 
permit herself to believe anything by an act of faith). Or he may be concerned 
with whether the articles of faith are or could be incompatible with scientifi-
cally established conclusions. Or he may be concerned with whether there is 
any kind of overlap between the articles of faith and scientifically demon-
strable conclusions, or between articles of faith and rationally self-evident 
truths. I think that we see Aquinas addressing all of these questions in the 
opening chapters of the Summa Contra Gentiles. 
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There we find chapters devoted to arguing that it is appropriate for God to 
reveal (and hence for humans to believe) theological truths that are scientifi-
cally knowable (I, 4), that it is appropriate for God to ask humans to assent 
to things that are beyond their capacity to demonstrate scientifically (and 
even understand, e.g., the Trinity and Incarnation) (I, 5), and that it is not 
foolish to assent to articles of faith, even if they are beyond the reach of 
rational investigation (I, 6). 
If we look just at what is known or believed, however, we see that there is 
an area of overlap: in addition to things that are known by all and things that 
must be accepted on faith by all, there is a set of beliefs which may be 
accepted on faith but which also are capable of being known. These beliefs 
constitute the praeambula fidei, mentioned earlier. The articles of faith, 
strictly speaking, are those beliefs available only to faith in this life. They 
stand above human scientific knowledge (as Divine knowledge), and the 
preambles belong in between. as articles that are revealed along with the 
articles of faith, but which are knowable by reason as well, at least by some 
people.!! 
The area of overlap is significant for the issue at hand. It shows that some 
of the teachings that are revealed along with the articles of faith are not only 
compatible with what human reason knows scientifically (in his sense) but 
they are part of that know ledge. While this does not imply that all the teach-
ings of the Christian faith are compatible with everything that reason discov-
ers, it is a source of encouragement nonetheless. When Aquinas treats faith 
and reason in the sec, he exploits the overlap. He begins by observing that 
there are two different ways of obtaining truths about God: from revelation 
and from "the natural reason." God has good reasons for permitting some 
people to believe the ones that are knowable and he has good reasons for 
asking all of us to believe the unknowable ones. And even though we lack 
evidence for the truth of these unknowable truths about God, it is not irra-
tional to accept them, since there are various testimonies to their truth. At 
this point Aquinas offers arguments that what reason knows must be compat-
ible with the revealed articles of faith that remain beyond the reach of our 
reason. Perhaps it should also be noted that Aquinas clearly thinks that many 
revealed articles both are and will remain beyond the reach of human reason 
in this life. 
In spite of the area of overlap, we must also remember that faith, strictly 
understood as the act of believing on the basis of a will moved to assent by 
the work of the Holy Spirit,!2 and Reason, the act of knowing first principles 
or knowing scientifically, are mutually exclusive in the sense that the same 
individual cannot both know that something is the case and believe it by faith; 
we either know it or believe it, but not both. However, it is possible for one 
individual to accept something by faith while another knows it, and likewise 
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it is possible for the same individual to accept a belief by faith at one time 
and later come to know it. So the act of faith and the act of knowing are 
exclusive with respect to any given belief by any given individual at a given 
time. Consequently, the same individual cannot both believe by faith and 
know by reason the same article at the same time. 
III. The Arguments for Compatibility 
Aquinas's strategy for justifying faith focuses primarily on content, for that 
is where the serious questions arise. Faith, which is an act of believing on 
the basis of an authority, is simply necessary for human life. None of us has 
the time or opportunity to learn from scratch everything we need to know, 
and so we constantly avail ourselves of the reports of others. Of course this 
introduces interesting possibilities of error; reporters may lie, misperceive, 
misreport, distort, be unduly selective or overlook crucial details in passing 
along information. But most of the time, we, or someone, can check up on 
what is being reported. The information can be verified by someone (although 
not by anyone) if he or she cares to take the time and trouble. Nevertheless, 
some reliance on testimony is indispensable, since none of us can check on 
everything ourselves. 
The articles of the Christian faith present a special problem in this regard, 
however. On the one hand it is claimed that it is necessary to believe these 
articles in order to enjoy the highest and happiest life. But on the other hand, 
these articles cannot be independently verified by anyone. Is God triune? 
There is no way to check up on this that does not involve divine revelation. 
So with these beliefs, we may not simply be adopting a shorter, more con-
venient way of acquiring useful beliefs, but we may be bypassing scientific 
evidential processes altogether. 
Aquinas addresses this issue in SCG, I, Chapter 6, just before he argues for 
the compatibility of the content of Christian faith with reason, where he 
argues that the adoption of Christian beliefs is compatible with regulating 
one's beliefs by reason. It is reasonable, he says, to adopt a set of beliefs that 
have been attested to by miracles, inspiration of simple people; fulfillment 
of prophecy, widespread acceptance of a call to a higher life, and the obvi-
ousness that these beliefs call one to a higher life. These considerations show 
that Christian belief is not foolish, even though the content of these beliefs 
is not accessible by rational means. 
Chapter 7 of the SCG, Book I, presents four arguments that the truths of 
reason are compatible in content with the truths of faith. The fact that the 
teachings of faith lie beyond verification and even full comprehension by 
reason does not deter Aquinas from trying to make an argument for compati-
bility. Furthermore, it is interesting that these arguments appear at the begin-
ning of a book intended to help unbelievers, that is, persons who do not accept 
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the Christian revelation. Is he guilty of begging the question and simply 
presupposing that this revelation is true? An unbeliever might regard the 
"conclusion" reported in the chapter heading ("the compatibility of the truth 
of reason with the truth of faith") as a trivial and uninteresting conclusion on 
the grounds that there are no truths of faith and that is the reason for the 
compatibility. But as we have just noted, Aquinas takes himself to have 
presented reasons in the previous chapter (6) for accepting this particular 
revelation as true, and also for rejecting Mohammed's alleged revelation as 
not worthy of credibility. So we should look at chapter 7 as arguing that we 
should regard this genuine revelation, whose content does not overlap with 
reason and which reason is therefore unable to verify (in the sense of dem-
onstration), as fully compatible with reason. 
A. Thomas's first argument trades on the idea that since each category 
consists of truths, they have to be compatible. The argument goes roughly 
like this: 
I. We are incapable of thinking the deliverances of reason, Le., proposi-
tions per se nota, to be false. 
2. Therefore, we cannot help but believe that the deliverances of reason 
are true. 
3. The articles of faith are confirmed in a divine way Gust argued in Ch. 
6). 
4. Any claim that has divine confirmation must be regarded as true. 13 
5. Therefore, we must regard the articles of faith as true. 
6. Only the false can be opposed to the true (from the definitions of 'true' 
and 'false'). 
7. Therefore, (we must believe that) the articles of faith are compatible 
with the deliverances of reason. 
Given Thomas's references to what we are capable and incapable of believing 
«(1) and (2» and what it is permissible and impermissible to believe «4) and 
(5», I understand the conclusion to have prescriptive force, as claiming that 
we are obliged to believe in the compatibility of faith and reason. This first 
argument emphasizes that each category consists only of truths, and therefore 
they must be compatible. The point of thinking is to acquire knowledge of 
the truth, according to Thomas, and our cognitive equipment is designed to 
be in touch with truth. How and why this is so has to be described and argued, 
and Aquinas turns to that later. 14 For the moment, his point is simply that we 
think this is so and we cannot help but think so. We cannot get ourselves to 
believe that something has been intuited or demonstrated and yet is not true. 
(Aquinas would have had trouble with Meditation I.) When we take ourselves 
to know something, we take it to be true. Likewise, when we accept the 
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articles of the faith, we do so because we take them to be divinely confirmed, 
as coming from God (Aquinas thinks Chapter 6 has provided this evidence). 
Thus we cannot take these articles as anything but true. But truths must 
always be compatible with truths, as anyone who knows the meanings of the 
words "true" and "false" knows (this is one of the first principles of thought), 
and therefore anyone who accepts the articles of faith as God's revelation 
must believe them compatible with what reason knows. 
At first glance, this argument seems to be absolutely right, and perhaps one 
may wonder who could disagree with it, unless one rejects the premise that 
there are divinely confirmed articles of faith, or thinks that we do not take 
scientific conclusions to be true. But I believe that the argument may have a 
genuine target, both in Thomas's era and our own. Thomas assumes that there 
is one unified system of truth into which all truth fits; he is therefore rejecting 
a view of some of his contemporaries on the Arts Faculty at Paris, sometimes 
labelled Averroism, and which Fernand van Steenberghen calls "radical Aris-
totelianism." These people " ... taught the philosophy of Aristotle [using Aver-
roes as the main interpreter] without concerning themselves with the points 
of opposition which exist between this philosophy and Christian doctrine."l5 
Thomas may be taken by extension to be rejecting views which makes theo-
logical views noncognitive, those which make theology and science separate 
"language games," and also complementarist views of religion and scientific 
knowledge which relegate each to different and non-intersecting spheres of 
inquirr In our own century, perhaps Donald McKay16 and the later Wittgen-
stein l might be examples of contemporary variations on Averroism. 
While this first argument for compatibility seems right, it also may seem 
less than fully helpful. Just why becomes clearer when we ask what Thomas 
must mean by "faith" and "reason" here. It is clear that he is thinking of the 
articles of the faith and those things that we know (cognita). It is important 
to take the word "know" very seriously in this context. In presenting the 
premises, Aquinas appeals to our inability to take these claims as false. We 
are unable because of the way evidence bypasses the will when we know 
things. Now this inability comes into play only when our know ledge is self-
evident (per se nota) or demonstrative-deduced from self-evident first prin-
ciples. Thus the argument does not assure compatibility for that knowledge 
which is "probable," which is firmly believed, supported by good evidence, 
but is not self-evident or deductively demonstrable. Many cases of apparent 
conflict, however, involve the area of the "probable," and the argument gives 
no guidance as to the source of the error nor does it even claim that there 
must be an error in reasoning in such cases. However, the argument does 
seem to me to have the salutary effect of making the believer expect that faith 
and reason, at least with respect to the truths of faith and the truths of reason, 
have to be compatible. 
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Aquinas's position, it must be granted, does claim something substantial: 
there cannot be a conflict between the teachings of the Christian faith and 
anything that we know. Therefore, if there appear to be conflicts, we must 
have made a mistake. We had better check back over our reasoning and see 
if we can discover our error. Thomas does assume that the error must be in 
our reasoning (our making inferences from the "first principles" of our sci-
ence, including possibly the inferences from the first principles of theology, 
although he never uses that as an example). Either any incompatibilities are 
apparent but not real, or if they are real, they are due to an error in reasoning. 
Apparent incompatibilities may arise when we take probable conclusions as 
fully scientific, i.e., deducible from first principles. 
This is the way Aquinas resolves one of the difficulties he faces. Aristotle 
was taken by many of his contemporaries to teach that the world has always 
existed, contrary to the article of faith that the world has a beginning in time. 
The problem disappears, says Aquinas, when we check Aristotle's reasoning 
and discover that his argument involves probable reasoning and is not a 
deductively conclusive proof. On the other hand, Aquinas also attacked the 
Augustinian tradition's philosophical arguments against a beginningless cre-
ated world. Neither position, he thinks, can be philosophically demonstrated. 
But because the articles of faith decisively teach that the world has a begin-
ning, this is the position the believer must take, even if Aristotle's arguments 
are the best reasoning we have. 18 An examination of the relevant reasoning 
shows that the eternity of motions is not securely known and there is no 
conflict between scientific knowledge and the articles of faith. 
Another substantial claim of St. Thomas's position is that conflict take the 
form of logical incompatibilities. He does not concern himself with compet-
ing frameworks, incommensurability, etc. This is not, I believe, because this 
sort of thing never occurred to him, but because he thinks foundationally, and 
therefore he thinks any alleged perspectival difference will cash itself out as 
an incompatibility somewhere down the line. Once this happens, we will have 
to go back and see whether we can isolate its source, a possibly daunting 
task. If a science is incomplete, that is, if we are unable to make explicit the 
foundational structure from top to bottom, we may find it impossible to get 
to the bottom of some incompatibilities. 
I said earlier that I agree with Aquinas's argument here. But I should say 
exactly what I think I have agreed to. I think his argument does not commit 
me to saying that theological conclusions can never conflict with scientific 
conclusions. The argument does commit me to say that the first principles of 
science (where these self-evident and necessary principles have been cor-
rectly ascertained by us) cannot conflict with the basic principles of theology, 
wl:;ich is "the knowledge of God and the blessed,,19 as that has been revealed 
to us, and consequently that what has been correctly deduced from these sets 
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of first principles cannot be incompatible. Assuming that the sciences (both 
the science of theology and the other sciences) are fairly complicated, there 
is no assurance that if an incompatibility showed up, it could be tracked down 
very quickly or easily. Aquinas's position does not assure us of quick or easy 
answers. But he does insist that a Christian must hold that there is compati-
bility at bottom; we cannot accept the possibility that there might be two 
truths incompatible with each other. 
B. In his second argument, Aquinas concludes that because revelation and 
reason both have God as their source, they have to be compatible. He argues 
as follows: 
1. Whatever a teacher introduces into the mind of a student is first in the 
mind of the teacher. (Unless his teaching is "fictitious," which cannot 
be said of God.) 
2. God is the author of our nature. 
3. Therefore, God has planted in us (Le., taught us) the knowledge of the 
principles we know naturally. 
4. Therefore, these principles are part of the divine wisdom. 
5. Therefore, whatever is opposed to these principles is opposed to the 
divine wisdom. 
6. Nothing opposed to the divine wisdom can come from God. 
7. But the articles of faith come from God. 
8. So the articles of faith cannot be opposed to the divine wisdom, and 
therefore they cannot be opposed the principles we know naturally. 
God's wisdom has to be consistent, and so, therefore, do the aspects of it that 
God has seen fit to give to us. This argument presupposes that there is a God, 
that this God created us with the cognitive abilities we have, and that this 
God has revealed himself. Besides this we have to agree that God possesses 
all scientific knowledge and whatever else we may know naturally. These 
assumptions would have been acceptable to Aquinas's Jewish and Islamic 
audiences as well as his Christian students, and so we may regard them as 
aimed at Jewish and Islamic believers, who were (ironically) the gentiles for 
whom the SCG was written. 
The second argument claims that because the articles of faith come from 
God and the basic principles of our knowledge come from God (as the author 
of our nature), all of this knowledge must be compatible in the divine wisdom. 
The argument uses as a premise that God knows everything he teaches. It 
need not be true in general of an honest teacher that the teacher knows 
everything that she teaches, although Thomas seems to think so. A teacher 
might try and might even succeed in teaching something she does not know 
herself. And a teacher might succeed inadvertently in teaching something she 
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didn't know, without dissembling or faking. So to buttress Aquinas's argu-
ment, let us assume that God knows everything that he teaches. Furthermore 
on certain conceptions of knowledge, it is impossible to know something that 
is not true; on such conceptions it follows that everything that God teaches 
is true, even without assuming God's goodness. Given this assumption, since 
the principles of reason and the teachings of faith both come from God, they 
are both part of his knowledge and hence compatible. It is clear, of course, 
that theology comes from God in a fairly direct way. But Aquinas holds that 
God is our teacher (quite literally, if the argument is to work) in making us 
so that we know certain things about our world, about him, etc. We are 
designed for scientific knowledge; it is not accidental. The " ... knowledge of 
the principles that are known to us naturally has been implanted in us by God; 
for God is the Author of our nature."20 Thus, says Thomas, God knows these 
principles himself. Of course God also knows the articles of faith, since they 
literally have their origin in God's knowledge (S.T., I, Qt, Art. 2), so both 
articles of faith and the principles of reason are known by God who can know 
no falsehoods, especially contradictions. A contradiction or incompatibility 
is literally inconceivable; it cannot even be thOUght by a clear, unconfused 
mind. Since God thinks both the truths of faith and the principles of reason, 
and his mind is clear and unconfused, faith and reason are not incompatible. 
This second argument seems less persuasive than the first. Perhaps there 
are suspicions attaching to it just because it seems so similar to an argument 
Descartes gives at the end of Meditation III and beginning of IV for the 
reliability of our faculties. 21 Descartes tried to argue that the nondeceptive 
character of God guarantees that we have no faculty that would lead us astray 
if we use it properly. Aquinas might be said to need such an argument here, 
since we need some reason to believe that our cognitive faculties, especially 
those involved in grasping the first truths of the sciences, continue to function 
in the way they were designed to by their Creator, and we need reason to 
think they were designed with truth in mind. But these observations serve to 
bring up the main reason why Aquinas's argument here is weak. The fact that 
God is the author of our nature and that God made our senses and intellect 
to function as they do does not entail that God teaches us what we know. The 
leap from maker to teacher is too great; the fact that God made us in such a 
way as to learn certain things does not prove that God teaches us those things. 
Nor does it follow, as I already observed, that if someone tries to teach p to 
someone else, the teacher must know it first. 
To defend Aquinas just a bit here, we should observe that he only needs to 
say that whatever principles we know are taught to us by God and taught 
reliably. All the same, it is possible (consistent) that God designed things so 
that certain principles would ineluctably be believed and that believing them 
is for our good, without it following that these principles are true. The prin-
ciples may be taught reliably without having to be true. Aquinas also assumes 
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that our faculties continue to function just as they were designed to; he does 
not entertain the possibility that we have, through our own evil, interfered 
with the functioning of our cognitive faculties in a systemic way, affecting 
even our ability to apprehend principles. Thus it is possible that God is the 
author of our nature and we have done something to make it malfunction. 
C. The third argument considers the hypothesis that "contrary cognitions" 
(contrariae cognitionei2) were somehow planted in us by God. Among "con-
trary cognitions" Thomas presumably includes first principles that lead to 
incompatible conclusions. If we found ourselves being led to contrary con-
clusions in this way, we would be unable to accept either starting point. This 
is what he means when he writes our intellect would be "chained" and it 
would miss out on the truth (assuming that one of the beliefs is true23 ). Since 
God would not make us miss out on the truth, he has not planted (immitter-
entur) any contrary cognitions in us. Therefore, faith (revelation) and reason 
cannot be incompatible. 
Since this argument depends in its essentials on the previous ·argument, I 
shall not pursue it further. 
D. Aquinas bases his fourth argument for compatibility on the nature of 
our knowing and the contention that this will remain constant as long as the 
rest of nature does, together with the belief that God does not try to get us 
to believe the impossible. It is, according to Aquinas, impossible for us to 
believe something that is obviously necessarily false. He refers to contradic-
tions and incompatibilities as "inconceivable" and I think he means that 
literally: given our nature, our minds are literally incapable of conceiving 
such a thought. I think it is understood that the incompatibility is clear and 
apparent; Aquinas does not think that we have special incompatibility detec-
tors that help discern the presence of hidden contradictions. Our nature is 
what leads us to accept various first principles, from which our scientific 
knowledge is derived. This acceptance is involuntary in the sense that we 
cannot withhold assent from these principles once they are clear to us. It is 
unchangeably part of our nature. If God were to "implant" in beings of this 
sort a set of beliefs contrary to these principles or their logical consequences 
(e.g., by revealing them as articles of faith), they would be in the position of 
havin~ to conceive the inconceivable or to think a thought that thought cannot 
think, 4 or we would have obviously contrary opinions existing in the same 
knowing subject at the same time. 
This fourth argument, while not identical to any of the previous three, does 
not seem to me to add anything substantial to those arguments,. and all the 
materials (i.e., premises) needed for this argument may be found in the pre-
vious ones, except for the idea that what is natural does not change as long 
as nature does not change. 
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IV. Aristotelian Science and the Faith 
As an Aristotelian, Thomas had to contend with fellow Aristotelians who were 
ignoring the tension between Aristotle and certain teachings of the church. 
His project is both to defend Aristotle and defend orthodoxy. Although Aqui-
nas's advice in Book I, Chapter 7, suggests that he would readily reject 
Aristotelian "science" at the allegedly heterodox points, this is not what he 
does. When Aquinas considers Aristotle's teaching on the eternity of the 
world, he labors mightily to save the science (i.e., Aristotle's argumentation) 
despite the apparent incompatibility between Aristotle's conclusion and 
Christian doctrine of creation ex nihilo. His "solution" seems to commit him 
to finding a mistake in Aristotle's reasoning, or something has been "incor-
rectly derived from the first and self-evident principles ... " (SCG, I, 7, [7]) 
by his colleagues in their readings of Aristotle. But Thomas fir:st looks for 
room between dogma and science. John Wippel, in an interesting and useful 
artic1e,25 shows that Aquinas not only looks for room in this way, he also 
shifts his position somewhat as he examines sources and sifts arguments 
during his successive treatments of the eternity of the world. Initially, in his 
Sentence Commentary, he suggests that even Aristotle did not intend to argue 
for the eternity of the world, but he only wanted to show that arguments 
against eternity were not scientific demonstrations.26 Later, says Wippel, 
Aquinas backed off from this "more benign reading" of Aristotle. Thomas 
also consistently attacked the teaching that creation in time is demonstrable 
(e.g., St. Bonaventure and other Neo-Augustinians). Wippel concludes, 
In sum, then, it appears that in Thomas's eyes, one cannot demonstrate either 
eternity or noneternity of the world. The Christian can only accept the 
noneternal character of the same as a matter of religious belief.27 
In the end, Thomas follows his strategy; he does not reject science or any 
scientific argument or observation. Instead he finds science unable to dem-
onstrate anything one way or the other on this question, and so the door is 
open to resolution by revelation. Thus Aristotle has not necessarily made a 
mistake, and if the Christian had nothing else to go on, a reasonable course 
of action might be to believe that the world has always existed?8 But as it 
happens, the Christian does have something else to go on, the clear revelation 
of Creation, and so does not accept what might otherwise be reasonable. On 
the other hand, because he accepts the unity of truth and the propriety of 
relying on God as a source of information, St. Thomas does not follow 
enlightenment evidential ism in allowing only evidence of the senses and 
reason to determine what he believes. 
When Aquinas deals with the immortality of the soul, he observes that 
Aristotle's position is less than totally clear, but that Aristotle provides the 
makings of an argument for immortality, at least for the immortality of the 
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agent intellect, even if he fails to draw that conclusion himself. The issue 
here then focuses on whether the agent intellect is One in all of us or whether 
there is personal immortality. So again, instead of finding a conflict between 
reason and faith and choosing one or the other, Aquinas works to eliminate 
the apparent incompatibility. However, I think it is clear that this time Thomas 
finds it necessary to do some revision of Aristotle. Even so, he works to 
"save" as much Aristotle as he can. 
Thomas's practice, then, is to try to save science as much as he tries to save 
the faith. He never seems to automatically respond simplistically or with a 
formula that rejects science. On the other hand, we do not find him suggesting 
that we reject or revise articles of the faith, although he has not ruled that 
out in principle. Insofar as he holds that the church decides the content of 
theology and does so infallibly, there is little or no scope for such revision. 
Aquinas's attitude is what one would expect from someone who sees each of 
the sciences as having a secure and (relatively) independent evidential base. 
V. Do the Arguments Help? 
The help St. Thomas does offer us is just like the help he might offer in the 
case of conflict between any two sciences: you must have made a mistake; 
go back over your work, reconsider your evidence, and make sure you have 
not drawn any conclusions not fully demonstrated by your premises. This 
help is exactly what you would expect from one who holds his conception of 
a science. Each science begins from necessary and immediate first principles 
which we cannot help but accept. Any conflict of the conclusions of one 
science with those of another, or any conflict within a science has to be due 
to some mistake. Faith is involved in the acceptance of the first principles of 
theology; it is the only science that does not receive its first principles either 
directly from the operation of the intellect or from another science whose 
principles are traceable back to the intellect. So Aquinas offers arguments 
designed to establish the compatibility of theology's first principles with the 
first principles of the other sciences. Once that conclusion is established, then 
theology is, so to speak, on at least as good a footing as every other science. 
When its conclusions conflict with those of other sciences, therefore, we 
should assume that somewhere, somehow, we have made a mistake in the 
derivation of a conclusion. Aquinas also appears to assume in Chapter 7 of 
SCG, Part I, that the mistake will be in the reasonings of the nontheological 
science, although no reason is given in this passage why we should make that 
assumption. 
So given his epistemology and his theory of the structure of science, Aqui-
nas's solution to the problem of potential conflict between reason and faith 
is just exactly what one should expect and it is eminently sensible. Of course, 
the solution is simpler to state than it may be to apply in practice; it may be 
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exceedingly difficult in practice to discover the errors in one's reasoning. 
Fallacies can be subtle and apparent only to a few, as Aquinas suggests is the 
case with the issue of the eternity of the world, and perhaps also with personal 
immortality. His solution, while affirming the integrity of faith, does not 
necessarily always cut in favor of the science of theology. Aquinas's practice 
in dealing with the issues of his own day favors careful thinking that finds 
some truth in the erroneous positions, so that opponents do not have to be 
branded as heretics or fools (something Christian practice today might do 
well to emulate). I suppose, too, although Aquinas does not say so, that if we 
find science to be in an insufficiently well-worked out state, we should not 
be too quick to decide that it is in conflict with faith. No doubt some research 
programs are going to be more appealing to Christians than others, but some 
open-mindedness may be necessary until all the connections become clear. 
Although we can appreciate the sensible character of much of Aquinas's 
advice, in the end I think his position has several serious defects for present 
day Christians trying to deal with these issues. I want to call attention first 
to some of the defects in his philosophy of science, and then look at some 
defects in his view of human thinking more generally. 
One of the more serious objections to Aquinas's solution to the problem of 
conflicts between faith and science is its reliance on an unacceptable episte-
mology and an antiquated view of the sciences. Aquinas links a certain de-
ductive structure of science, proceeding as it were axiomatically from 
postulates and first principles (axioms?), with an epistemology of science or 
theory of justification. Thus we know scientifically and fully justifiably be-
cause we see the links between the claim under consideration and the first 
principles. Of course, this may not be the order of our discovery of these 
claims, but that is another matter. Even if we take the sciences to have the 
axiomatic type of structure that Aquinas's position suggests, it is quite clear, 
especially in the case of mathematics (one of the sciences more readily 
axiomatizable) that the axioms and postulates we settle on will not always 
commend themselves as self-evident (per se nota). Self-evidence is not al-
ways one of the main criteria for choosing axioms or postulates when we are 
giving axiomatizations. What is worse, some claims that one would have 
thought were per se nota and candidates for axioms or postulates have been 
shown to lead to notorious logical paradoxes. For example, it might seem that 
the property of non-self-exemplification should be able to be exemplified, 
but it cannot. In short, it appears that it will not work to try to get an axiomatic 
structuring of science to coincide with the sort of theory of justification that 
Aquinas wants. Because Thomas's arguments for compatibility are based on 
this structure, rejection of the structure means that certain key premises in 
his arguments must be rejected. 
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A second way Aquinas has of dealing with incompatibilities, which I have 
touched on only briefly in this paper, is to discover that our arguments for 
incompatible conclusions are probable arguments, that is, arguments which 
make plausible or highly probable a given conclusion, but fall short of dem-
onstration, where a demonstration is a straightforward deduction of the gi ven 
conclusion from the premises. One can see why this might be ~n attractive 
solution for someone holding Aquinas's theory of the structure of science, 
but once again it is of almost no use to us. Not only does it once again 
presuppose an outmoded view of science, it is also unattractive in dealing 
with the problems we have to face. For it appears that most of the scientific 
challenges to theistic belief are based quite directly on probable reasoning. 
Yet pointing this out hardly seems to alleviate the difficulty we experience. 
It bothers us that scientific evidence suggests that humans evolved from other 
life forms while the theological evidence suggests that humans are unique 
and special creations, and it does not help much to be told that the scientific 
evidence is, of course, only probable here, and so we are not logically com-
mitted to an incompatibility in our thinking. While we do view the theories 
of science as strongly and consistently probable on their evidence, we do not 
think this is a weakness that renders scientific conclusions less firm than 
theological ones. Perhaps this is seen as a weakness by some of our contem-
poraries who are wont to say, "Well, it's only a theory," and feel perfectly 
consistent in preferring their theology to some scientific point. But I think 
this simple answer is failing to take science seriously enough. 
Aquinas not only holds that the first principles, the principles per se nota, 
that constitute the starting points for the sciences are certain, he also assumes 
that they are clear. Indeed, it is their clarity that renders them irresistible. 
However, when we look at our starting points in theology, the Scriptures, and 
in the sciences, those empirical observations, we find ambiguities, uncertain-
ties, problems of understanding and interpretation. This is a question that will 
be better discussed by a proper philosopher of science than by me; my only 
concern here is to note that there are notorious problems of understanding 
and interpretation in choosing and in interpreting data in the sciences as well 
as in theology. And as soon as we admit that there are difficulties of inter-
pretation, then questions arise about what may and may not legitimately 
influence our interpretations. It may be that theology can sometimes properly 
influence science and the framing of scientific theories, and that scientific 
conclusions can sometimes influence how the Scriptures are interpreted. I 
myself think it unlikely that theology and science can be in principle under-
stood completely independently of the other, especially if it is true that sci-
entific theories (and perhaps theological theories as well) are under-
determined by the evidence for them. 
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Finally, saving the best for last, I must enter a Calvinist caveat about our 
cognitive abilities. Aquinas's whole account of this problem of the compati-
bility of faith and reason seems based on an idealization that here ignores the 
possibility that there is something systemically wrong with our thinking, that 
there might be patterns of unbelief that we are particularly prone toward, or 
thoughts that we constantly avoid because of "the smoke of our wrongdoing," 
to use St. Anselm's colorful phrase. Are there factors that, due to our fallen-
ness, we are led to overemphasize or underemphasize, or improperly bring 
in or fail to bring in? If we appreciate the underdetermination of our theories 
by the evidence for them, then the possibility that a theory may be skewed 
by an improper or irrelevant factor is a real one. One notes the importance 
of the theory of evolution to theorists who are intent on putting together an 
atheistic world view. Might this not lead them to find certain ideas and as-
sumptions more credible than if they did not have this interest? In Thomas's 
defense, we should observe that elsewhere he has much to say about the 
weakness of our intellect and our proneness to error, so he can hardly be said 
to ignore completely human intellectual weakness. He might say that errors 
of the sort just described will have to cash themselves out as bad premises 
that will show up in reviews of the reasoning that led to an incompatibility. 
But some of these factors will not show up as premises, but rather as dispo-
sitions to find premises credible or incredible. 
Yet one of Aquinas's central assumptions is surely correct and must guide 
Christian thinking on this topic as well: the assumption that all truth is one, 
unified, and must fit together compatibly. Inconsistency means we have 
trouble and need to straighten something out. In the long run we must either 
drop a view or get some further explanation that shows how the apparent 
inconsistency is only apparent and not genuine. However, for the short run, 
we may be unable to come up with the required further explanation or see 
why a view should be dropped, and simply find ourselves stuck. However 
that may be, the assumption of consistenc~ is the basis of Aquinas's strategy, 
and it must be the basis of ours as well.2 
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NOTES 
1. See also Aquinas's De Veritate, Q. XlV. For more exposition see the papers by 
Konyndyk and Wolterstorff in Audi and Wainwright, eds., Rationality, Religious Belief, 
and Moral Commitment (Cornell, 1986). There is a recent translation of the questions on 
faith from the Summa Theologiae by Mark Jordan, Faith (Notre Dame, \990). 
2. Aquinas considers Augustine's definition of belief as "to think with assent," and 
concludes that when the proper distinctions have been made, this definition will do. 
20 Faith and Philosophy 
Thomas first distinguishes several senses of 'thinking.' If 'thinking' is used to mean "any 
actual consideration by the intellect," then defining belief as "thinking with assent" does 
not yield a proper definition (it is not a sufficient condition) because it also applies to 
knowledge. But if we take thinking to be "deliberation by the intellect (excluding senses) 
accompanied by inquiry preceding a clear vision of the truth," then we can accept the 
definition of belief as thinking (in this latter sense) with assent as adequate (necessary and 
sufficient). Since knowledge need not involve inquiry and deliberation, the definition now 
is sufficient, he thinks. 
3. While knowledge is superior to faith in the final analysis, faith's (Le., theology's) 
certitude is superior to that of human knowledge.S.T., I, QI, Art. 5. 
4. This is expressed in S.T., II, II, Q2, Art. 2, as credere deo (believing God), credere 
deum (believing about God), and credere in deum (believing for the sake of God). (The 
translation in this note is Jordan's. See note 1). 
5. S.T., I, Q2, Art. 2, ad 2. 
6. Ibid. Perhaps this is also implicit in S.T., I, QI, Art. I, ad l. 
7. Not limited to the narrow or strict set of articles of the Christian faith (or sacra 
doctrina). See S.T., I, Ql, Art. I, ad 2. 
8. As in s.T., I, Q79, and Question XV on higher and lower reason in De Veritate. 
9. We might call this "subjective" certainty, or confidence, in order to make clear that 
it refers to the state of the subject-the degree of confidence the subject has. Thomas holds 
that there is another sort of certainty, call it "objective," or causal, which refers to the 
cause or the basis of the belief. Since the basis or cause of faith is the Divine Truth, it is 
more certain than knowledge and the other intellectual virtues produced by reason in the 
objective sense, but because we have less clarity about faith than about what we know by 
reason, and clarity is the source of confidence, reason may be subjectively more certain 
than faith. However, the "objective" sense is primary, and is what we mean by certainty 
when we speak of it "simply," that is, without qualification. See S.T., II, II, Q4, Art. 8. 
10. Truths that are pe r se nota, sometimes translated as "self-evident," are described as 
being "known as soon as the terms are known," in S.T., I, Q2, Art. I, Obj. 2., where the 
first principles of demonstration are offered as examples, as well as "The whole is greater 
than the part." 
II. See the Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Chaps. 3 and 4, and the S. T., I, Q2, Art. 2, ad 1. 
Aquinas usesthe terms sacra doctrina, preambles, the articles offaith, to refer to different 
but overlapping set of propositions. The distinctions have their basis in the different ways 
we have access to these propositions. 
12. That is, the virtue of Christian faith, which is what Thomas is discussing in the 
Summa. My characterization combines elements from II-II, Q. 4, Art. 1, and Q. 6, Art. 2. 
13. I have supplied this premise which is required for validity and is clearly assumed. 
14. See the S.T., I, QQ 79-86, and De Veritate, Q XlV. 
15. St. Thomas Aquinas and Radical Aristotelianism (Catholic University of America 
Press, 1980), p. 2. 
16. See his The Clockwork Image (Intervarsity, 1974). In fairness, I must emphasize 
that I said "perhaps." It is not completely clear that McKay holds this sort of position. 
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17. I take the suggestion from Stuart Brown's "Christian Averroism, Fideism, and the 
'Two-fold Truth,'" in The Philosophy in Christianity (Cambridge, 1989), edited by 
Godfrey Vesey, 207-223. 
18. Locke's position on probable conclusions in his Essay Concerning Human Under-
standing, Book IV, Chapter 18, Section 9, is similar. 
19. S. T., I, Q 1, Art. 2. 
20. SCC, I, 7, 2. 
21. I have in mind Descartes's conclusion that "[God] surely did not give me the kind 
offaculty which would ever enable me to go wrong while using it correctly," which occurs 
in the course of his argument for the principle of clarity and distinctness at the beginning 
of Meditation IV. (Using the translation in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, tr. 
Cottingham, Stoothoff, and Murdoch (Cambridge, 1984), Vol. II, pp. 37-38.) 
22. Pegis translates this as "contrary know ledges." I think that translation is misleading 
here, and I do not follow it. 
23. In the case of contrary beliefs this assumption is not necessarily justified; for 
contradictory beliefs it is. 
24. To borrow memorable phrases from George Bishop Berkeley and S<j>ren 
Kierkegaard, respectively. 
25. "Thomas Aquinas on the Possibility of Eternal Creation," in his Metaphysical 
Themes in Thomas Aquinas (Catholic University of America Press, 1984), Chap. VIII, 
191-214. 
26. According to Ralph Mcinerny, Aquinas always accepted Aristotle's contention that 
the world cannot have come into being in the same way that things in the world come into 
being-by being produced by something which potentially is what actually comes to be. 
If this were the only sense of coming to be, the world could not have come to be. To be 
created is a very different sense of coming to be. 
27. Ibid., p. 192. 
28. St. Thomas does not seem to commit himself on whether there is probable argument 
for both conclusions and on what, in the absence of revelation, the most reasonable course 
of action in the present case would be. Wippel shows that he does not commit himself on 
the issue of the possibility of eternal creation until the late De Aeternitate Mundi, and even 
there certain textual problems complicate our understanding of Aquinas. Wippel, pp. 
205-14. 
29. An earlier and briefer version of this paper was presented at the Pascal Centre of 
Redeemer College in August 1992. Kent Emery, Jr., Ralph Mcinerny, Alvin Plantinga, 
Del Ratzsch, and Arvin Vos have given me helpful comments on subsequent drafts. I am 
most deeply indebted to Norman Kretzmann, who commented extensively on the early 
version, for suggesting improvements, saving me from numerous errors, and pointing me 
to additional helpful sources. 
